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A

s early as 400 BCE, Xenophon had stated that “not numbers or strength
bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in
soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them.”1 A strong soul, in modern times, is equivalent to high combat motivation. Likewise, combat motivation’s centrality to a successful outcome in military operations, from
patrolling to full-scale wars, cannot be overstated. Given the historical asymmetry of forces between Israel and its enemies, the way in which Israel has
managed to parry significant conventional and nonconventional attacks—
often in the face of substantial quantitative inferiority—has been due mostly
to its superior qualitative edge based on its armed forces’ professionalism, superior training methods, and combat morale.
Combat motivation is a key factor in enabling conventional armies
to win conflicts; in Israel’s case, it has been “referred to as the ‘secret weapon’
of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).”2 On numerous occasions, quantitatively
inferior armies have been able to have the upper hand because of their fighting spirit, aggressiveness, and relatively buoyant high morale. Indeed, research has demonstrated time after time that there is a “strong relationship
between cohesion, soldiers’ level of morale, and combat efficiency.”3
This article looks at the key factors that can enhance the combat motivation of soldiers. Given the IDF’s many operational successes throughout
its 56 years of existence, the article provides particular historical references
to the IDF’s experiences in building and maintaining high levels of combat
motivation throughout its combat arms. It also will point to recent negative
108

Parameters

trends that have weakened in part the IDF soldier’s combat motivation. Its
purpose is to instill in the reader an appreciation of the necessity for armed
forces to continually focus on and build upon the human element of battle in
spite of the technological developments brought about over the last decade by
the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.
Such a focus is especially imperative for the US armed forces, as
well as for other modern Western armies, where the search for technological
solutions often has been pursued at the expense of personnel. The need to focus on the human element of battle is also due to the increasing probability
that most armies will be involved in urban warfare battlegrounds, where the
technological edge of conventional armies is significantly reduced by the
complex terrain and human elements involved within it.
However, in spite of the fact that combat motivation is such a key ingredient to winning battles, most military and academic establishments have
found quite some difficulty in measuring and regarding combat motivation
when, for example, analyzing an army’s overall power capabilities or when
giving a threat assessment of an army’s enemies. Their problem often has
been the labelling of intangibles—such as combat motivation—correctly, because “an idea that is not observable and measurable (strength of will) is hard
to compare against one that is (physical strength).”4 Yet, if “war is . . . an act of
force to compel our enemy to do our will,”5 as Clausewitz wrote, then it is important to take account of an army’s combat morale, because “will” in the
context of a battlefield can be equated to combat motivation. This shall principally be the case on the future battlefield where, as argued by numerous military analysts, “the focus of decision and control will shift downward toward
the squad and the platoon.”6
Furthermore, despite all the technological advances in warfare and
the continuous debate on the extent to which there has been a revolution in
military affairs, the nature of man has not changed. Regardless of the vast
technological advances that warfare will undergo, its conduct always will be
in the hands of human beings. “This means that individual actions, human imperfections, performance thresholds, and varying personalities will still influence and determine a conflict’s outcome.”7
As Ardant du Picq argued, “The human heart in the supreme moment
of battle is the basic factor.”8 Thus it is important to look at the human element
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of the battlefield, particularly combat motivation and morale. Indeed, taking
account of the human element is even more compelling in the future battlefield, which in the author’s opinion will be for the most part the urban arena.
There, because “a battlefield filled with buildings, tight streets, underground
tunnels, and the other obstacles of a built-up area takes away the range of
many of today’s most highly developed weapon systems,”9 the importance of
the individual soldier’s initiative and capabilities will be magnified.

Defining Combat Motivation
What is meant by morale in the military context? Among the numerous definitions of morale, the one provided by John Baynes offers a good starting point. He defines morale as “the enthusiasm and persistence with which a
member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group.”10 In the
military milieu, “morale” and “motivation” are frequently used interchangeably. However, morale highlights the condition of the group (or the unit), while
motivation describes principally the attribute of an individual.11
Frederick Manning defines morale as “a function of cohesion and
esprit de corps.”12 Unit cohesion always has been necessary in combat, because each member of the unit relies on the other in order to survive and to
carry out successful combat operations. Cohesion has been defined as “the
bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission.”13
The IDF, since its establishment, has had the reputation of high combat motivation and effectiveness, which have been developed and maintained
by its customary emphasis on professionalism and realistic combat training.
Nevertheless, unit cohesion and esprit de corps also have been deciding factors
of high morale and combat motivation, and in the IDF’s case they actually have
been considered “the most important source of combat motivation.”14
In the IDF, efforts to develop unit cohesion and strong esprit de corps
have traditionally taken place at the start of a soldier’s military service or career with the administration of an oath to him, “a ritual which goes back at
least to the sacramentum, the Roman military oath.”15 In the IDF’s case, for
example, armored corps and 55th Paratroop Brigade recruits are sworn into
the IDF at Latrun and at the Western Wall, respectively, two highly symbolic
and militarily significant places where each fought gruelling, victorious battles in 1948 and 1967. Moreover, the differences in uniform between the various brigades help foster esprit de corps, because they enable the soldier to
“promote the soldier’s status in the eyes of comrades, civilians, and the enemy.” They also help remind the soldier of his regiment’s achievements as
well as the unit’s past near-mythical battlefield successes.16
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“Combat motivation is a key factor in enabling
conventional armies to win conflicts.”

The recruit’s successful conclusion of training is customarily celebrated by the handing out of a piece of uniform, normally the beret, which not
only distinguishes that specific brigade from others, but also creates an atmosphere of competition between them, consequently raising the operational
standards across the whole army. Moreover, the end of training is usually
marked by some arduous task such as the stretcher march or a gruelling final
route march, which are perceived as necessary rites-of-passage. Lectures on
the history of the infantry and armored brigades’ and of the Special Forces
units’ military history also create a great degree of esprit de corps. The IDF
has extensive training programs that educate recruits and in particular officers about their brigade’s heritage. Such programs include trips to Jewish heritage sites, former battlefields, military or regimental museums, and military
gravesites.
Another crucial esprit de corps factor affecting combat motivation is
the institutional value system a particular army embodies; values which are
most relevant to the unit member are especially important. In the IDF’s case,
these are: “(1) Tenacity of purpose in performing missions and drive to victory; (2) Responsibility; (3) Credibility; (4) Personal Example; (5) Human
Life; (6) Purity of Arms; (7) Professionalism; (8) Discipline; (9) Comradeship; and (10) Sense of Mission.”17
One of the most important institutional values of the IDF has been
encapsulated in the concept of achavatt lochameem (combatant’s brotherhood), which fulfills the IDF’s tenet of comradeship.18 Indeed, “if the soldier
trusts his comrades, he will probably perceive more safety in continuing to
fight alongside them, than in rearward flight away from them and the enemy
which they face.”19 Such trust is developed through shared experiences of
mutual support found in a characteristic family unit. Likewise, such comradeship is crucial, because it satisfies another factor impinging on combat motivation, the soldier’s need to belong and to feel that he is part of something
significant and to which he can personally contribute.20
In the IDF, such a family unit is found in the structure of the battalion
and is described as “a yechida organit (organic unit). Organizationally this involves (1) a framework characterized by a permanent membership and structure of roles, and (2) that upon mobilization the whole battalion (as one
Autumn 2004
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complete organizational unit) is recruited” for up to 25 years after regular
military service.21 Such cohesion, thus, not only has developed in peacetime
training, but even more so during combat operations.
Furthermore, according to Anthony Kellett, “Israelis regard fighting
as very much a social act based on collective activity, cooperation, and mutual support,” whereby every soldier depends on the other and particularly on
the professionalism and leadership capabilities of the unit commander.22 According to the IDF, for example, the company commander should possess
several specific attributes and values, such as “face-to-face leadership quality, personal integrity, and the ability to create mutual trust between the
sub-commanders and the soldier and to [instill] trust in the weapon and fighting systems.”23
Indeed, a Combat Readiness Questionnaire survey of over 1,200 Israeli combat soldiers conducted by the IDF Department of Behavioral Sciences in May 1981 showed that the soldier’s trust in his immediate leaders
contributed positively in boosting his combat motivation and his unit’s combat morale. Such trust in their commanders was shown to depend “upon the
commander’s professional capability, his credibility as a source of information, and the amount of care and attention that he pays to his men.”24

Competency and Communication
“A leader’s professional competency is the primary leadership factor that soldiers say decreases their stress.”25 Lower levels of combat stress
and demoralization associated with professional leadership can be explained
by the fact that quite often the unit leader is able to show bravery in the face of
adversity and set a personal example, becoming a model of inspiration.
For example, the importance of the professional competency of
noncommissioned officers (NCOs)—particularly at the hulia (team), kita
(squad) and tzevet (crew) levels—was clearly underlined by current Chief of
Staff Moshe Ya’alon when recently celebrating their role in the IDF. He
noted, “NCOs provide IDF units with experience and a professional backbone. By carrying out your duty and striving for excellence, a positive statement is made to the soldiers that serve under you.”26 To be sure, NCOs and
junior officers play a fundamental part in setting the standards and values of
excellence and professionalism, which are needed even in a “people’s army”
such as the IDF.
Another important role that the leader must take on is that of information provider for his subordinates. Communication and trust between the
provider and recipient are crucial, because informing soldiers during combat
of the real state of affairs will help lessen the fear caused by the unknown.
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“Taking care of soldiers does not simply mean
providing for their comfort and
protecting them from uncalled-for orders.”

Reuven Gal’s “Golan Heights” study showed that the assessment and awareness of the expected combat zone and of the adversary’s power and ability not
only improved the soldier’s self-confidence as a fighter, but also further developed his combat motivation.27 Such knowledge, in fact, regularly reduces
the uncertainty factor, which often plays on the imaginary fears of a combat
soldier in action.

Personnel Downsizing
Other circumstances of uncertainty that negatively affect the soldier’s
combat motivation or the unit’s combat morale are related to his time of service
both at the operational level and at the professional level. At the operational
level, soldiers will often deploy and serve willingly, “but when their redeployment date is uncertain, trust with the institution is strained.”28 At the professional level, uncertainty often comes in the form of personnel downsizing.
Research has shown that “downsizing severely damages the psychological contract between an organization and its downsizing survivors,” because it raises the soldier’s level of uncertainty in terms of if or when the
downsizing will affect him, both in regard to his tenure and in regard to the increased workload he will be taking on.29 Consequently, extensive budgetary
cutbacks and personnel downsizing in the IDF over the last few years may
have had a deleterious effect on combat motivation as well as on the general
esprit de corps.
Indeed, current plans aim to reduce the number of professional IDF
personnel—particularly those belonging to the ground forces—by 20 percent
over the next year, and this also will include General Staff members. Although
some have argued that such cuts will improve the IDF’s efficiency and reduce
its bloated rear-echelon support and administrative branches, one senior IDF
officer has argued, “There is a fear that, instead of becoming a smaller, cleverer
army, we will merely become smaller.”30 As a result of such downsizing, IDF
Ombudsman Lieutenant General Uzi Levtzur has reported a rise in complaints
by officers who refuse to be discharged due to economic reasons. Such official
complaints appear to be a new phenomenon in the IDF.31
Autumn 2004
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The Leader as Protector
The leader is also the crucial link between the higher echelons that are
geographically removed from the frontline of the battlefield and his subordinates who must accomplish the tasks assigned to them. The unit leader must
make sure that such tasks do not recklessly endanger his men, but at the same
time are accomplished.32 To do so, a field commander needs to gain his subordinates’ trust before he can exert any influence, which is best achieved when his
soldiers are able to identify with their commander, with the organizational values that he embodies, and with the missions that he is ordering them to accomplish. Frequently, the soldier’s identification with the unit leader and with the
army’s values and missions that the unit leader must promote occurs when the
leader is involved directly with, if not leading, his subordinates during actual
combat, because status differences become blurred when such officers live
with their men, sharing their discomfort and their fears.33 Nonetheless, such
identification can take place even when training together.
The unit leader quite often must also demonstrate to his subordinates that he genuinely cares about them by taking care of their physical—
and emotional—needs. When leaders take adequate care of their soldiers,
then their soldiers will more diligently carry out their duties, typically without the need for much supervision. This is particularly the case when a unit
leader is able to provide the best equipment for his unit, because it demonstrates that the leader is making sure that his soldiers have the best chance of
surviving combat due to their real or perceived technological superiority
over the enemy. Too often, IDF soldiers have had trouble perceiving the importance of their unit’s assignment—and their own duties—because they
have not been given the supplies they require.
The inadequate equipping of IDF reservists for urban warfare has
been a particular problem over the last three years of the al-Aqsa (or Second)
Intifada. The Israeli state comptroller’s 2003 report, for example, stated in
October 2003 that the IDF currently lacks half the ceramic vests needed to
protect soldiers in the occupied territories. The report also pointed to the fact
that the IDF’s primary patrol vehicle, the Sufa (Storm) jeep, does not meet basic protection requirements.34 The IDF’s main armored personnel carrier, the
M113, still requires infantry soldiers to surround their M113s with sandbags
for better protection during urban operations.
Thus, quite often, the unit leader’s reassurances about having provided adequate equipment for his soldiers have been insufficient, because
“regardless of how logical and well-meaning the explanations may be for the
unit’s shortages, soldiers will evaluate their role and their unit’s mission on
the basis of their own perceptions and no one else’s.”35
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“Unit cohesion in turn creates strong incentives
to continue fighting when engaged in combat.”

Moreover, taking care of soldiers does not simply mean providing
for their comfort and protecting them from uncalled-for orders by higher
command echelons. It also entails “training them to become seasoned soldiers who could survive on a battlefield, because they are technically, physically, and mentally proficient.”36 However, due to the economic crisis and the
increasing use of both reservists and regular soldiers, according to the chief
officer of the IDF Ground Forces, Major General Yiftah Ron-Tal, over the last
year “reservists have not trained at all . . . and the standing army only set aside
four weeks out of six months to train.”37
Soldiers may become embittered with their military leadership due to
training restrictions that are often justified by politically motivated budget cuts
or continuous operational assignments, because they know that such restrictions could rapidly get them killed in battle due to their lack of expertise in certain combat scenarios and operations. However, it has not been only the lack of
training that has endangered inexperienced soldiers while carrying out operational duties. There also has been a series of IDF training accidents recently
due to negligence on the part of both the instructors and commanders involved
in their preparation and execution. Such negligence has led to a number of fatalities and other casualties and consequently to the dismissal and, in certain
cases, indictment of some platoon, company, and battalion commanders.38
Survey research of Israeli veterans from the Lebanon War showed
that the feeling of loneliness (i.e., lack of support given by a tightly-knit combat unit) was the best single predictor of combat stress reaction and that the
best predictor of loneliness was low officer support.39 Thus, combat leadership, particularly at the unit level, has become even more important due to the
fact that modern warfare, particularly urban warfare, requires the dispersal of
numerous physically isolated units requiring small and autonomous actions
based on tactical ingenuity. The legitimacy of the leader within the specific
unit and trust in his capabilities can develop only on a continuous face-to-face
relational basis with all soldiers of his particular unit; hence, it is more likely
possible to develop at squad, platoon, and company levels.
Such trust and mutual support have been ultimately articulated in the
IDF’s absolute standard of retrieving casualties from the battlefield at whatever price—that is, even at the price of suffering more casualties. Such loyAutumn 2004
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alty throughout Israel’s wars has been a powerful inducement for heroic acts
on behalf of many soldiers. Indeed, “the normative power of the cohesive
group causes the strong personal commitment on the part of the soldier that he
ought to conform to group expectations,” which in the IDF has often tended to
emphasize the spirit of initiative and heroism.40

Unit Cohesion
Various studies have shown that unit cohesion or esprit de corps not
only strengthens a unit’s level of morale, but also acts as “a powerful preventive measure against psychiatric breakdown in battle and as a ‘generator’ of
heroic behavior among the unit’s members.”41 This was particularly substantiated for the IDF during the early stages of the Yom Kippur War in the Golan
Heights theater of operations: “Members of IDF tank crews who were well
acquainted with one another and had trained together were more combat effective, and, despite equally intense battle, had fewer psychiatric casualties
than members of tank crews who were not well acquainted, and, though
equally well trained, had not trained together.”42
Whereas such cohesion tends to develop mostly during military service in other Western armies, in Israel such solidarity also has been a result of
the collectivistic character of Israeli society. Thus, such cohesion is already in
part present before conscription takes place. In effect, Israeli society has been
socialized into a cohesive society based on the principle of gibush (crystallization).43 According to Eyal Ben-Ari,
The gibush metaphor implies . . . [that] the internal strength and solidity of both
the individual and the group flow from the unifying sense of belonging, of being securely together “in place.” The social ideal of gibush involves an emphasis . . . on joint endeavours, on cooperation and shared sentiments, on solidarity
and a sense of togetherness.44

This process of crystallization is reinforced as the members of a unit
meet up yearly for their reserve service and often becomes the source of
strong friendships, if not brotherliness.45 Such unit cohesion in turn creates
strong incentives to continue fighting when engaged in combat, because the
combatant ultimately will fight in order to not let the other members of his
unit down. Another social aspect enhancing unit cohesion is “linked directly
to broad, societal agreement about the citizen’s duty to serve in defense of the
nation. . . . Soldiers must be aware that their society will exact penalties for
being AWOL and for deserting” and will exact considerable social penalties
for dereliction of duty.46
Hence, according to J. Glenn Gray, author of The Warriors, “Soldiers have died more or less willingly not . . . for any abstract good but be116
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cause they realize that by fleeing their post . . . they would expose companions
to grave danger. Such loyalty to the group is the essence of fighting morale.”47
It is essential to strengthen unit cohesion because during combat,
isolation and loneliness assault the cohesive power of a unit. Consequently,
the enemy will always try to “target the human bonds that the commander has
so diligently prepared.”48 If the commander has not developed unit cohesion
beforehand, then the unit’s combat effectiveness will crumble under the pressure of attack.
S. L. A. Marshall’s study of World War II US infantrymen led him to
conclude that “men do not fight for a cause but because they do not want to let
their comrades down.”49 Due to the principle of gibush, this tendency is even
greater in Israel. Indeed, most Israeli reservists who report for reserve duty not
only do so because they feel a duty to protect Israeli citizens, but also because
they do not want let their comrades down and face their criticism the next time
they report for reserve duty. After having missed only one tour of reserve duty
with his usual unit during Operation Defensive Shield in April 2004, reserve
Staff Sergeant Amos Harel explained how his unit comrades reacted:
But once I got there this time, I got all kinds of looks from commanders, soldiers who were under my command, and so on. They kept saying, “Oh, we
thought we would never see you here again” and so on, and I was only absent for
one tour which I did, of course, serve somewhere else. . . . People were a bit
doubting for the first few minutes—“Where has he been?”50

Mission Accomplishment
At the primary or individual level there are other factors that provide
IDF soldiers with high levels of morale and combat motivation. These are,
“for each soldier, a goal, a role, and a reason for self-confidence.”51 Rather
than fighting for a very abstract purpose, the soldier needs to achieve definite
and tangible objectives in order to sustain high combat motivation. This is
why in the IDF’s case the strategic or operational objective takes precedence
over the manner in which operations are carried out. Indeed, the IDF’s traditional emphasis on directive control gives subordinates right down the chain
of command the greatest possible freedom of action.52
In combat operations, the criteria for judging whether or not the goal
has been obtained are often relatively unambiguous—“conquer the objective
and stop enemy troops from advancing. However, [in operations other than
war], it is often very difficult to understand what constitutes mission success.”53 This is particularly the case when hostilities continue during diplomatic talks, negotiations, and even after interim agreements, as was the case
for the IDF during the whole Oslo era and during the first Israeli-Palestinian
Hudna (cease-fire) between the months of September and October 2003.
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Rules of Engagement
A soldier’s certainty about his role in a combat situation is also crucial in maintaining high combat motivation. Such a role is normally outlined
during pre-operation briefings and by clear, albeit flexible, rules of engagement (ROE). To be sure, such rules must be flexible enough to allow for tactical improvization during military operations, particularly when soldiers have
to deal with guerrillas, terrorists, and civilians contemporaneously in complex urban theaters.
For the Israeli soldier, such ROE have been clear-cut and flexible
enough when dealing with conventional forces and tactics. Due to the sensitive nature in carrying out military and other security-related operations in urban theaters and the close domestic and international scrutiny that such
operations receive, however, Israeli ROE since the start of the first Intifada
have continuously changed and often restricted the Israeli soldier from
achieving his mission goals. Thus, not giving soldiers sufficient personal
control to accomplish their mission has negatively affected their combat motivation on numerous occasions. As another writer has noted, “restricting personal control psychologically disengages soldiers from the mission, resulting
in soldiers not feeling pride in their work.”54
Despite such limitations, the professionalism and improvization of
IDF officers and their unit members have often helped limit the erosive effects of restrictive and sometimes shifting rules of engagement. As one reserve infantry company commander pointed out when asked about the
difficulty of operating in civilian-populated areas under shifting ROE, “I consider myself a professional officer and I do what I do from a professional
point of view. I have no other considerations. . . . You deal with the situation as
it is and if you are trained and you have common sense then you know how to
deal with it.”55
Self-Confidence
A soldier’s role and self-confidence are both developed through the
extensive training he or she is put through, as well as the combat experience
gained through battles or military operations, which in the Israeli soldier’s
case has been a life-long and extensive endeavor. Training is a key ingredient to increasing or maintaining the soldier’s combat morale both at the individual and unit levels, because it is in training that unit cohesion is built
before combat troops go on any military operation. Indeed, as S. L. A. Marshall noted, the “tactical unity of men working in combat will be in the ratio of
their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of one another.”56
Extensive training also averts the soldier from losing control of his
martial faculties and duties when the extensive chaos created by the fog of
118
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war ensues, because “training is habituation” and he can, thus, execute “by
rote . . . under stresses of shot and shell, confusion, uncertainty and the infectious fear of his comrades.”57 He basically will have developed during training the necessary combat skill to make the kill. However, no matter how much
energy is put into training the soldier, if he is not adequately motivated, the
outcome will constantly be low combat performance, because ultimately
“performance equals knowledge times motivation.”58

Building Cohesion is Today’s Task
The nature of warfare is changing dramatically, especially in terms
of its actual duration—that is, it is becoming shorter and shorter. Consequently it very important that unit cohesion is created in advance. Short spurts
of low-intensity operations simply do not have the same coalescing effect as
prolonged or even relatively brief high-intensity conflicts. Nonetheless,
peacetime cohesion is not just cultivated in training alone. As revealed in a recent study of US combat soldiers in Iraq, “Much of the cohesion in units is developed simply because there is nothing else to do except talk.”59 It is
essential to form in peacetime the friendship ties crucial in time of war, because “in high-performance units, leaders and followers are friends off duty
as well as on.”60 Thus, for example, it is easy to understand that the motivation
behind Staff Sergeant Sean Sachs’ and his friend’s decision to join the Nahal
Infantry Brigade was that “we all wanted to go there, because our friends
were there. . . . That’s why we all volunteered; we asked to be in that unit.”61
Training needs are becoming more difficult to satisfy for reservistintensive armies, such as the IDF, which train one month a year, if at all. This is
because the technical and interpersonal skills needed by the 21st-century soldier to carry out sub-conventional military operations in urban or other smaller
civilian scenarios are much greater. And unless reservists are thoroughly
trained, not only will they lack the necessary military skills to tackle such scenarios, they also will lack the necessary cohesion, which is so vital when coming to grips with the moral dilemmas of operating in civilian settings.
Because of extensive budget cuts and the concurrent growing need
for reservists and regular soldiers in carrying out military operations as well
as tedious garrison duties, training has dramatically diminished in most IDF
combat units since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada. For example, such
budget cuts have reduced the time set aside to train an IDF recruit to qualify as
an infantry soldier from 14 to 10 months, whereas the course training for elite
units has been shortened to just one year, instead of the one and a half or two
years it traditionally took. The effects on unit cohesion and individual morale
are not yet known.62
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Despite such reduced training opportunities, and regardless of the
reduced threat of conventional warfare, it remains important to heed Ardant
du Picq’s warnings on the need to maintain cohesion even during times of relative quiet: “A wise organization ensures that the personnel of combat groups
changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time manoeuvres shall
be comrades in war.”63
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